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Start-ups of new firms are important for economic growth. However, start-up rates differ 
significantly between countries and within regions of the same country. A large empirical 
literature studies the reasons for this and attempts to identify the regional determinants of 
start-ups. In contrast, there is a much smaller theoretical literature that attempts the formal 
modelling of the start-up process within a region. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to 
this small literature by introducing a general theoretical model of the entrepreneurial start-
up process. The model links start-ups to economic growth and can be applied to understand 
growth in a regional context. We derive five propositions that fit the stylized facts from the 
empirical literature: (i) growth in the regional economy is driven by an expansion in the 
number of start-up firms that supply intermediate goods and services; (ii) improvements in 
human capital will enhance the rate of start-ups; (iii) improvements in the relative rates of 
return to entrepreneurs and business conditions will raise start-up rates; (iv) an increase in 
regional financial concentration will reduce the start-up rate in a region and; (v) increased 
agglomeration/urbanization in a region has an a priori ambiguous effect on start-up rates.  
Keywords: start-ups, entrepreneurship, frictions, economic growth 
JEL classification: M13, O12, O40, L26  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Lisa Winkler at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship,1 the ‘process of starting and continuing to expand new businesses’ 
(Hart 2003: 5) is important for economic growth and development (Naudé 2008; 
Baumol et al. 2007; Schramm 2004).2 Substantial resources are devoted in developed as 
well as developing countries on raising the rate of entrepreneurship (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1998: 27). The rate of entrepreneurship can be measured statically as the self-
employment rate or dynamically as the start-up rate of business firms (Wennekers et al. 
2002: 29). The start-up rate is increasingly seen as important, if not more so, as the 
growth of existing firms. They are more likely to grow (Lingelbach et al. 2005; Johnson 
et al. 2000), to create new jobs (Audretsch et al. 2006: 25; McMillan and Woodruff 
2002: 166), and to promote new and flexible organizational forms (Kim et al. 2006: 20). 
In many transition countries, where there were no significant private sectors to start out 
with, new firms often strengthened reforms by improving economic conditions 
(McMillan and Woodruff 2002: 153).  
It is therefore understandable that many countries and regions devote increasing 
resources towards raising the rate of start-ups. It is however the case—and here the 
empirical evidence is fairly robust—that start-up rates of new firms differ significantly 
between countries and even between different regions of a country (Reynolds et al. 
1994; Tödtling and Wanzenböck 2003; Stam 2006; Naudé et al. 2008). Given the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and employment creation (Fonseca et al. 2001) 
this difference in regional start-up rates can be an important reason for regional 
disparities (Naudé et al. 2008). A large empirical literature attempts to identify the 
determinants of start-ups, most of this focusing on the regional context. In contrast, 
there is a much smaller theoretical literature which attempts the formal modelling of the 
start-up process. Existing models aim to explain various aspects or obstacles of start-ups 
such as start-up costs (Fonseca et al. 2001), firm growth and size dynamics (e.g., Lucas 
1978; Jovanovic 1982), credit constraints (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1993; Evans and 
Jovanovic 1989), and exit decisions (e.g., Bosma et al. 2005). 
A general theory of entrepreneurial start-ups, and the effect that these might have on 
regional economic growth, is however still lacking. In this paper, we attempt to fill this 
gap, by formulating a theoretical model of the entrepreneurial start-up process. The 
model is a dynamic, non-linear model in contrast to many studies which have used 
linear models to empirically predict new firm births or introduce borrowing constraints 
in a homogeneous linear form (Reynolds 1993: 19; Mesnard and Ravallion 2005: 3). A 
further novel aspect is that we link start-ups to regional output growth in our model—an 
aspect that is paid scant attention in the theoretical literature. We derive a number of 
propositions and testable hypotheses from our model. 
                                                 
1  There are many different views on the nature of entrepreneurship. Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 30) 
identify thirteen distinct roles of an entrepreneur. More commonly, however, and for purposes of this 
paper, entrepreneurship is seen as involving either/or risk-taking, innovation, arbitrage and co-
ordination of production factors in the start-up of a business. (Fogel et al. 2006: 542). 
2  According to Iyigun and Rodrik (2004: 1-2) ‘a key obstacle to growth in low-income environments is 
an inadequate level of entrepreneurship in non-traditional activities’.   2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and Section 4 contains some 
concluding remarks. 
2  The determinants of start-ups 
In this section we provide a brief review over the literature on the regional determinants 
of entrepreneurial start-ups. The purpose is to identify the main determinants of start-
ups. In the next section we build on this literature by formalizing start-ups in a general 
endogenous growth model.  
At the outset it should be noted that most empirical studies on the determinants of start-
up rates make use of regional data within a particular country, because comparisons 
between countries are often difficult due to non-comparable data and definitions 
(Reynolds 1993: 11). One can distinguish between studies that attempt to identify macro 
level constraints or determinants, those focusing on industry level and firm level, and 
those that attempt to test the predictions from theoretical models on the relationship 
between wealth, inequality, credit market constraints, and entrepreneurship. 
On a macro level, evidence tends to suggest that macroeconomic conditions such as the 
state of employment, GDP and inflation, and interest rates matter. Highfield and Smiley 
(1987) empirically analysed the determinants of start-ups in the USA over the period 
1948 to 1984, using rates of incorporation as an indicator of start-ups. They found that 
on a macroeconomic level, five factors were significant in affecting start-up rates: real 
GNP growth, expenditure on equipment (investment), the unemployment rate, real 
interest rates and inflation. Wang (2006) finds that in Taiwan production costs, capital 
costs, and unemployment are significant determinants of start-up rates. Bosma et al. 
(2005) using data for the Netherlands over 1960 to 1999 find that unemployment is 
statistically significantly associated with higher start-up rates. Macro level conditions 
will apply to all regions in a country, but will have different spatial implications to the 
extent that economic activity agglomerates, and to the extent that industry level 
composition and dynamics will differ across regions. 
Reynolds (1992) found that industry level characteristics such as industry profits and 
entry barriers affect start-ups rates. Reynolds (1993) and Reynolds and Storey (1993) 
identified six broad determinants of entrepreneurial start-ups in a region, namely 
demand (measured by the size of the population and size of the economy), urbanization 
(agglomeration), unemployment, personal household wealth, specialization (industry 
level differentiation), and government spending on infrastructure, education, and health.  
On an industry level, studies on Belgium, Germany, Korea, Norway, Portugal, and the 
UK have found a ‘mixed pattern’ of determinants/frictions. Table 1 below, taken from 
Reynolds (1992: 278), summarizes the significant frictions to start-ups found in these 
five country studies. 
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Table 1: Determinants of start-ups: empirical evidence from five countries 




Expected profits  5  1 
Industry growth  5  1 
Product differentiation (marketing)  1  4 
Scale economies  2  3 
Industry size  3  1 
Capital requirements (finance)  –  4 
Source: Reynolds (1992: 278). 
Table 1 shows that generally, profits, industry growth, and industry size can be expected 
to be positively related to the rate of start-ups, and the capital requirements, the need for 
product differentiation can be expected to be negatively related to start-up rates. Scale 
economies seem to have an a priori ambiguous effect, although, as pointed out by 
Reynolds (1992: 282), start-up rates tend to be higher in urban areas than elsewhere, 
suggesting that agglomeration may matter for start-up rates. Agglomeration may have 
negative effects on start-up rates once an industry level perspective is taken, since 
incumbents in an industry might reduce what has been termed ‘market room’ or market 
potential. Evidence from the Belgian retail industry suggests that start-ups in this 
industry are affected by this market room (Carree and Dejardin 2007). 
Firm level/individual level studies generally point to the importance of human capital, 
which has been confirmed as important for start-up rates in a number of theoretical 
models discussed in Section 2.1. Kim et al. (2006: 9) recognize that educational 
achievement may act as a signal for quality of human capital as it provides specific 
skills which will be needed in the new venture, it raises the status of the recipient, and it 
acts as a sorting mechanism. These benefits of human capital are important as 
mechanisms for reducing or overcoming frictions related to finance (educated 
entrepreneurs may find it easier to obtain credit), marketing (skilled entrepreneurs can 
better identify their market niche), network forming (educated entrepreneurs may have 
higher social standing and so better networks) (see also Backes-Gellner and Werner 
2007). Indeed, evidence has been found to substantiate the view of ‘entrepreneurial 
ability’ in the Evans and Jovanovic (1989)-type models as overcoming frictions due to 
imperfect capital markets. This reflects the view that ‘one cannot invoke capital market 
imperfections to explain deficiencies of entrepreneurship... for part of the role of an 
entrepreneur is precisely to overcome such factor-market imperfections’ (Leff 1979: 
47–48). 
Related to human capital, but less easy to quantify or measure, is the effect of cultural 
factors and the entrepreneurs’ background. A number of studies have found that 
children whose parents were entrepreneurs are more likely to become entrepreneurs 
themselves (Giannetti and Simonov 2004; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Davidsson and 
Honig 2003). However, for other cultural factors the evidence may be mixed. Research 
based on the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSID) in the USA found that 
cultural background was not a significant determinant of entrepreneurial entry, but that 
education and experience was (Kim et al. 2006: 18).   4
In the literature, the notion of start-up costs feature importantly (e.g., Mesnard and 
Ravallion 2005; Fonseca et al. 2001; 2007). These costs are seen as general costs such 
as legal compliance, red-tape, etc. to be incurred in formalising a business. Fonseca  
et al. (2007) use data from nine countries to find support for the view that start-up cost 
weakens the relationship between wealth and start-up rates. 
Other determinants of start-up rates that have been identified on a firm level in the 
literature include tax rates. Reynolds (1992: 282) report that earlier USA studies have 
found that only property tax rates had a significantly negative effect on start-ups, with 
income tax being insignificant as a determinant or friction in the start-up process. More 
recently however Gentry and Hubbard (2000) found that progressive marginal tax rates 
discourage start-up rates and that the size of this effect will depend on the gap between 
taxes on wages and taxes on profits (assuming that there are no better opportunities for 
tax evasion in self-employment than in wage employment). 
Finally, a large literature focuses on the effects of wealth and financial constraints of 
entrepreneurial start-ups, stemming from the work of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and 
Banerjee and Newman (1993). In their models, individual wealth is a significant 
predictor of the probability to start a firm, and this is interpreted as due to credit market 
constraints. 
While capital requirements are significant in the earlier studies reported by Reynolds 
(1992) and summarized in Table 1, the overall empirical evidence for the significance of 
financial constraints on start-ups have been mixed and on the negative side (Kim et al. 
2006: 7; Munshi 2007; Paulson et al. 2006). Furthermore, Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt 
(2000: 160) point out that the frequent complaints by entrepreneurs captured in surveys 
about lack of access to finance ‘often masks technical and managerial inadequacies’. In 
fact, some authors doubt whether financial constraints are that binding on start-ups, and 
see it to be more important in the expansion of existing businesses rather than in the 
creation of new firms (Estrin et al. 2006: 702). Kim et al. (2006: 7) have also noted that 
start-up requirements, even in developed countries, may be quite low—so that they can 
be met through own savings, credit from family members and informal borrowing. In 
the words of Hurst and Lusardi (2004: 321) ‘even if some households that want to start 
small businesses are currently constrained in their borrowing, such constraints are not 
empirically important in deterring the majority of small business formation in the 
United States’.  
Second, Banerjee and Newman (1993) suggest increased start-up rates (self-
employment) as economic development levels improves, due to the fact that individuals 
now have on average greater access to financial resources. Empirical evidence from the 
GEM survey found however that there is a U-shaped relationship between start-up rates 
and level of economic development as measured through per capita income (Wennekers 
et al. 2005). Thus, in poor countries, start-up rates are high, and when a country 
develops, the start-up rate falls as more opportunities for (safer) wage-employment are 
created (Iyigun and Owen 1999: 454). After a certain threshold is reached, start-up rates 
start to increase again. The threshold that is relevant here refers to structural changes in 
the economy: much of the increases in start-ups in richer countries have been due to the 
development of the services sector, as well as due to changes in the structure of demand, 
as consumers demand more individualized goods where economies of scale do not 
apply (Wennekers et al. 2005; Bosma et al. 2005). This suggests that macro level factors   5
such as the state of wage employment and the structure of the regional economy are 
important determinants of the start-up rate. 
In the next section, we present a general model of entrepreneurial start-ups, within an 
endogenous growth framework. We attempt to incorporate the insights from the 
literature surveyed in this section, and show how regional policies may affect the rate of 
start-ups. 
3 The  model 
Most of the studies into start-ups as surveyed in the previous section have focused on 
particular determinants or obstacles to start-ups. They have also, despite the fact that 
most empirical studies of determinants have made use of regional data, not explicitly 
considered the regional (spatial) dimensions of the decision to start up a firm. In the 
model that we set out in this section, we attempt to address these shortcomings by 
constructing a general model that explains the most salient determinants of start-ups, 
and by incorporating a regional (spatial) dimension. The latter is based on the notion 
that when different regions (space) of a country are introduced into a model, it allows 
for space to permit regional monopolies of products and services to come into existence, 
wherein entrepreneurs can fulfil the functions of creating (innovating) new goods and 
services and imitating goods and services from other regions (arbitrage/disequilibrium). 
Thus our entrepreneur acts according to both the Schumpeterian and Kirznerian notions 
of entrepreneurship. 
3.1  Aggregate production process in the region 
In our model entrepreneurs start up small firms which we assume supply intermediate 
goods to a final goods sector. Intermediate goods include activities such as services, 
maintenance work, craft and trade, transport and logistics, commerce activities, and 
engineering. These small firm activities are local, and offered to the local producer of 
the final product. In treating start-ups as providers of intermediate goods, our model is 
related to that of Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996: 34) who show that if a particular 
(regional) economy produces a limited range of intermediate goods, the final 
(consumer) goods sector will be characterized as ‘primitive’ in production methods and 
will have little demand for sophisticated, new inputs. This will lead to lower incentives 
for potential entrepreneurs to start-up new firms. The economy can get stuck in such an 
underdevelopment trap with primitive production in its (small) modern sector. They also 
point out that there might, in such an ‘underdevelopment trap’ be a case for assistance to 
new start-ups since these can provide both pecuniary and technological externalities if 
they start producing new intermediate goods—which will induce final good producers 
to demand more of these (which will improve the incentives for other entrepreneurs to 
start up firms due to greater demand and the example provided in the application of new 
technology). In their model, as in ours, start-ups face positive start-up costs which 
include the costs of developing a product variation and all other cost of bringing a new 
good to the market. 
Thus in a well-defined economic region a number N of these small businesses exist, 











final product Y of the region is produced with local human capital H and N local 
intermediate inputs xij supplied by N, the small, local firms. We also assume here human 
capital is immobile between regions.  
The production function3 for the representative local final product producing firm i is  
 
 (1) 
where A represents the degree of urbanization. It represents the positive external effects 
from localization and urbanization economies on the firm’s total factor productivity. 
Growth is driven by an expansion in N, denoting the number of small firms in the 
market and hence the number of different intermediate goods available. Suppose that all 
private firms have the same size, xij = xi (which is true in equilibrium) then the quantity 
of output is given by 
1
ii i YA HN x
αα − =  which is a positive function on N. In order to focus 
on determinants of start-ups the final output sector can be modelled rather simply. 
Specifically, we propose a continuum of final good producing firms supplying to a 
competitive final goods market in the closest urban centre available to the firms in the 
specified region. The market price for the final good is given at price P. 
Firms producing the final good maximize profits according to the profit function 
Y
iii j i j PY H p x υ Π= − − ∑  with pj denoting the price of intermediate inputs xij and υ 
denoting the human capital wage rate. For simplicity we omit the representative firms 
index i and assume the market for human capital to be competitive. Using the first order 




and determine the wage rate of regional human capital, namely 
 
 (3) 
3.2 Start-up  of  firms 
A start-up firm will offer a new intermediate product variation to the final output sector. 
Each product variation has certain properties that make the variation unique compared 
to other already existing variations. In order to get the new product to the market, the 
start-up firm has to invest in start-up costs. Start-up costs are a barrier to entry to the 
                                                 
3  This specification of a production function originates from Ethier (1982). Similarly, Romer (1987) 
used this specification to model technological change and growth, driven by newly invented variations 
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market and by overcoming these, the entrepreneur opens up a new market segment. 
Start-up costs include all costs such as initial capital endowment information and 
organization and management costs, administrative costs, costs of learning, cost of 
acquiring and developing a business idea and business plan suitable to obtain finance 
from a financial intermediation.  
In this model we assume that start-up costs χ are determined by the degree of 
urbanization A and the density of product variations already in the market indicated by 
the density of competitors of the SME  / NY δ = . With an increasing density of 
competitors, it becomes more difficult and hence costly to set up a new variety. For the 
urbanization parameter A both, a negative as well as a positive effect can be possible. 
An increasing degree of urbanization will increase the potential ability of the final 
product sector to absorb additional varieties. However, more urbanization also may lead 
to increasing congestion. Hence at this stage, we leave it open if one or the other effect 
is dominant 
(,) () AA χχ δε δ ==  
In addition to start-up costs there are permanent costs to operate the business. These 
costs are denoted by cx. These can also include the opportunity costs of starting a firm 
and becoming self-employed. Due to these start-up costs, once a small firm is set up it 
will remain the only supplier for the specific good and remain a monopolist for the 
specific product variation. 
Since there is no immediate income, start-up costs must be credit financed at the loan 
rate rl. We assume that external financing is the only viable option. To simplify, we 
assume a firm that revolves loans infinitely and services interest only (i.e., Ponzi finance 
is excluded). Denoting the deposit rate rd, the present value of set-up costs (Vs) including 
finance is  
 
 (4) 
3.3  Activities of start-ups 
Due to barriers of entry and costs of challenging an existing market, every new firm can 
act as a local monopoly. Each period’s profits are determined by the price of the product 
variation pj and the periodic costs  x c . These periodic operating costs per x are assumed 
to be the only production costs per unit output of the intermediate good. These costs 
may also include opportunity costs of being an entrepreneur or a satisfying 
entrepreneurial net income which is instantaneously consumed. Hence net periodic 
profits are 
x
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where ϑ  represents the given individual probability of business failure and () 1 ϑ −  is an 
indicator for market opportunities and hence the probability of success. Monopoly 
profits are maximized by the optimal choice of the intermediate good price pj4 
 
 (6) 




As long as there is no steady state equilibrium, start-up entrepreneurs realize a net rent. 
However, in a steady state equilibrium the net present value of the new firm will just 
cover total set-up costs which are Vs=Vm. Thus periodic monopoly rents are eventually 
fully distributed as income of the entrepreneur and under competition used to finance 
start-up costs. We can extend this to take into account non-pecuniary benefits of 
entrepreneurship but for the sake of simplicity leave this for future elaboration. 
With respect to financial markets, start-up activities from the private small business 




The description of households linked to the final output sector is standard. The 
representative household maximizes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function 
 
with ρ denoting the time preference and 1/θ indicating the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. As the aggregate income flow consists of interest income from deposits 
Drd and rental income υH, the budget constraint is given by 
                                                 
4 See  Appendix  1a. 
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where  c γ  is the growth rate of consumption. 
3.5 Financial  intermediation 
Financial intermediation occurs when an economic agent transfers surplus funds 
(savings) from households and firms to borrowing households and firms in the form of 
loans. In the formal market economy the function of a financial intermediary is 
performed by banks. Following the contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) it is widely 
accepted that informational asymmetries and agency problems can result in newer, 
smaller firms finding it difficult to access sufficient external finance, i.e., being credit 
rationed (Bonnet et al. 2005: 2). 
The problem of small firms being credit rationed can be more severe in remote regions 
of a country where sometimes no more than one or two operating banking groups exist, 
and where monitoring costs can be prohibitively large. Also, proximity to banks in 
lagging regions is often limited. As a consequence access to formal bank borrowing 
may be an obstacle to the start-up of small businesses, with entrepreneurs having to 
consider other, more informal, options to obtain start-up funding (Mason and Harrison 
2002). 
However, a weakness of informal finance is that the informal financial sector tends to 
have a highly concentrated structure (Montiel et al. 1993: 1). A region with a high 
concentration market power by financial intermediaries (formal and informal) will face 
high credit rationing of start-ups. Hence, this region will have low start-up rates, low 
investment, and overall lower economic growth than regions with better access (less 
concentration, more collateral). Over time this differential access to financial 
intermediation can lead to widening income inequalities between different regions 
(Orford et al. 2003: 17). 
In order to model concentration of market power in the financial market we assume a 
historical given number of banks B. Each bank b offers deposits Db to households and 
loans Kb to potential start-up firms. Banks have symmetric monitoring costs c. The 
profit function of bank b is given as 
 
 (10) 
where rd(D) is the deposit demand function and D denotes total deposits in the region, 
and ϑ  is the expected default rate of the loans given to SMEs. As the bank modelled as 
.
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a pure intermediary the balance sheet of the bank can be written as Kb = Db when the 
bank maximizes profits subject to the balance sheet constraint. Then, the first order 
condition (FOC) is 
 
Rearranging the FOC and using the definition of total deposits (D = BDb) and the 
definition of the elasticity of the deposit demand function  
 
 
we obtain an optimal deposit rate for banks offered to the public 
 
 (11) 
The solution of the banks’ optimization problem gives a region’s loan-deposit rate 
spread. As can be seen from Equation (11) a region’s spread is determined by two 
factors, namely the costs of monitoring (c) and the concentration of banks measured by 
the index (1+1/Bη). A lower number of banks in a region will increase the concentration 
of financial intermediaries and widen the interest spread. 
In theory we are free to go one step further by looking at full market equilibrium. We 
would endogenously determine the number of banks and apply the zero profit condition 
to the banking sector. This would take away the pressure for market entry by additional 
banks. But, as we would like to focus on the number of banks rather than on some 
additional factors which might determine this number and the interest spread in the 
market, we end our analysis of the financial intermediation at this stage. 
3.6 Solving  the  model 
So far we have three central equations to solve for. First, we have a fully elastic loan 
demand function (see Equation 8) 
(Loan demand curve) 
 







=  ( Ramsey Rule) 
Third, from the financial sector characterized by concentration (defined as a small 
number of banks) we obtain the loan-deposit rate spread (see Equation 11) for the 
supply of loans by banks. Hence, we obtain the loan supply function 
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 ( Loan Supply Curve) 
Proposition 1: The loan demand function (8), the loan supply function of the banking 
sector (11), and the Ramsey Rule (9) determine the steady state growth rate of the SME 





The resulting equilibrium for the particular region can be graphically illustrated as in 
Figure 1. Equations (8) and (11) represent the economy in the loan market and with (9), 
and the steady state assumption we can determine the steady state growth rate for the 
number of start-ups in the region, as well as the growth rate of the region in general (see 
Proposition 1). 
 




                                                 
6  For a proof see Appendix 1c. 
() ()
2 21 3 2
2 11 1 1 11 11
1
()
YN x b HP c A c
AB
αα α





⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ == − + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦  12
4 Implications 
The model constructed in Section 3 allows us to investigate the effects of various 
frictions on the start-up rate of firms. In the sub sections that follow we will illustrate 
the impact of profits, education, and agglomeration on the start-up of firms. We will use 
Figure 1b to illustrate these effects. Both in endogenous growth theory and the new 
economic geography these factors are important determinants of regional growth, 
inequality, and divergence, and as we proceed we will justify the focus on these factors 
as determinants of entrepreneurial start-ups. 
4.1   Education 






The importance of education for start-ups builds on the spill-over models following 
Lucas (1988). It suggests that entrepreneurial start-up rates will be higher in localities 
that have a relatively highly educated population and an economic environment 
favourable to the accumulation of knowledge.  
The education level in a region or country (e.g., as measured by the proportion of the 
population with a particular qualification) has a clear effect on the equilibrium growth 
rate of start-ups in our model, as is illustrated in Figure 1b. Increasing human capital 
will increase marginal productivity of intermediates in the final product sector. Hence 
the demand for intermediates increases, and the Net Present Value of each product 
variation potentially increases. As a result, small firms are able to pay a higher loan 
rate—this results in the loan demand function shifting upwards in Figure 1b. With 
increasing deposit rates in credit market equilibrium, the supply of financial resources 
will increase and hence also the start-up rate of new businesses. 
4.2  Profits and business environment 
Proposition 3: Any factor that improves the profits of start-up firms will raise the start-








An important assumption in the model is that start-up firms are local monopolies for 
product variations of intermediate goods in their region. For these firms the present 
value of the sum of positive periodic profits  () [ ] j xj j
x
j x c p − = π  is maximized. If these 
periodic profits increase due to, for instance, decreasing periodic costs ( x c ), start-ups 
are able to pay higher loan rates. In this case, the loan demand curve in Figure 1b shifts 
                                                 
7  For a proof see Appendix 2. 
8  For a proof see Appendix 3.   13
upwards. With a higher deposit rate start-ups have better access to financial sources and 
the growth of the number of start-ups will accelerate.  
Proposition 4: An improvement in the business environment and hence an increasing 







As far as the business environment is concerned, our model captures these by the start-
up success rate () ϑ − 1 . The value of () ϑ − 1  may differ for a variety of reasons—such as 
uncertainty, political instability, including a deterioration in the quality of entrepreneurs. 
Opportunities for start-ups to supply intermediaries are particularly positive if the 
industry sector is in good shape. However, in this model, the failure rate is exogenous. 
With a decreasing rate of failure, the start-up firms would be able to finance a higher 
loan rate and the loan demand curve in Figure 1b shifts upwards. Further, from the view 
point of the banks a decreasing default rate would increase the deposit rate the banks are 
able to pay and hence let the loan supply curve turn right. The banks are able to offer a 
higher deposit rate for each loan rate. The total effect is an increase in the growth rate of 
start-ups. 
4.3  Agglomeration, competition, and congestion 
For the ‘once-off’ start-up costs χ we assume that these costs are determined by the 
degree of urbanization A and the density of start-up (small firm) competitors  / NY δ =  
and hence product variations already in the market. With a higher density of 
competitors, it becomes more difficult and hence costly to set up a new variety (e.g., 
more needs to be spent on finding an additional niche).  
Proposition 5: The effect of urbanization and agglomeration is ambiguous as increasing 
congestion costs  ,A ε η −  may overcompensate positive externalities from agglomeration 
effects.10  
Thus, for the urbanization parameter A both a negative as well as a positive effect can 
be possible. An increasing degree of urbanization will increase the potential ability of 
the final product sector to absorb additional varieties. Increasing urbanization also may 
lead to increasing congestion. Hence at this stage, we leave it open if one or the other 
effect is dominant. 
The inclusion of urbanization and agglomeration is based on explanations of 
entrepreneurship that emphasize market size, spill-overs, and imperfect competition. 
Henderson (2000: 2) points out that a high degree of urban concentration is essential for 
a country to kick-start industrial development. In the endogenous growth literature, 
urban agglomerations are important for entrepreneurial activity because they provide 
these dynamic information externalities that are important for innovation (as in Romer 
                                                 
9  For a proof see Appendix 4. 
10 For a proof see Appendix 5.   14
1987 and Lucas 1988). A large strand of the literature deals with the benefits of 
agglomeration for the birth and growth of new firms (see e.g., Tödtling and 
Wanzenböck 2003: 352–3). However, there are other factors, often ignored in the 
literature, which can work in the opposite direction. With increasing economic size and 
density congestion costs will increase. Congestion costs include higher levels of 
competition and barriers to entry and can also reflect a failure of small start-up firms to 
benefit from knowledge spill-overs due to agglomeration (Acs and Varga 2004). 
Tödtling and Wanzenböck (2003: 353) identify another channel through which 
increasing agglomeration can have a discouraging effect on start-ups, namely through 
the establishment of ‘lock-in’ situations due to industrial specialization. They point to 
the dominance of sectors with high entry barriers and the absence of specialized 
business services needed for new firm start-ups. 
In our model both, benefits and disadvantages of urbanization and agglomeration via 
increasing congestion costs, are covered. An increase in A is beneficial as long as 
positive externalities overcompensate potentially increasing congestion costs. In this 
case the loan demand curve shifts upward with an increasing A. Increasing congestion 
costs indicated by  ,A ε η  are covered by the parameter ε(A) which potentially raises start-
up costs with an increase in the agglomeration parameter A. If congestions costs become 
high enough the loan demand curve in Figure 1b shifts downwards.  
Which effect will dominate may largely be an empirical question, and differ between 
localities. Naudé et al. (2008) find evidence of congestion effects in the metropolitan 
areas of South Africa. 
4.4   Concentration of market power in financial markets 
Proposition 6: An increase in regional financial concentration will reduce the start-up 





We illustrate the effect of access to finance (and bank concentration) with the help of 
Figure 1b. In the figure concentration of market power is indicated by the number of 
banks B operating in the local financial market. This reflects bank concentration and 
monopoly power, as well as the physical proximity of entrepreneurs to banks. With a 
decreasing number of banks (increased physical proximity) and an increasing local 
market power the loan supply curve shifts upwards in Figure 1b. The equilibrium 
spreads and loan rate increases and hence the start-up rate declines due to more 
expensive loans. It can be noted that a similar effect will occur, if for some reason, a 
bank’s monitoring costs increase—which could result if the number of potential 
entrepreneurs which can be serviced by each branches increases. Increasing financial 
concentration and lower proximity to a bank would therefore be a friction that reduces 
the start-up rate of firms. 
 
                                                 
11 For a proof see Appendix 6.   15
5 Concluding  remarks 
Start-up rates differ significantly between countries and within regions of the same 
country. A large empirical literature studies the reasons for this and attempts to identify 
the regional determinants of start-ups, and the obstacles or impediments to start-ups 
across different regions. However, the theoretical literature which attempts the formal 
modelling of the start-up process within a region and its impact on regional growth is 
much smaller. In this paper, we try to contribute to this small literature by introducing a 
general endogenous growth model of the entrepreneurial start-up process. The model 
links start-up frictions to economic growth and can be applied to understand growth in a 
regional context. 
Our model has two crucial ‘foundational’ assumptions. We assume that when spatial 
considerations come into play, alert entrepreneurs can identify region specific 
opportunities and by utilizing these become local monopolists. In doing this they can 
imitate technological innovations from other regions, or innovate. We also assume that 
these entrepreneurs are especially active in supplying intermediate goods and services to 
final good producers. This distinction has been shown in the literature to be important to 
link entrepreneurs with qualitative and structural economic change in a region. It allows 
us to relate increases in the number of start-ups (which correspond to greater diversity in 
intermediate goods) to increases in economic growth. 
As in basic models of entrepreneurial occupational choice, access to finance plays an 
important role in our model. We generalize our model to include other constraints by 
linking these to the availability of finance. Thus for instance our model is able to show, 
as in Fonseca et al. (2007), that higher start-up costs reduce start-up rates through a 
capital market effect. As the start-up costs need to be financed, the access to external 
finance becomes important. Even if the financial intermediation is called sometimes 
‘bank’ in this model, it is easy to think of other lenders (even the Mafia) to the start-up 
entrepreneur. The important issue addressed is that there is market concentration and 
hence inefficiency in the financial sector. Further, we derived propositions that 
education, the relative opportunity costs of being an entrepreneur, and the business 
environment are positively related to start-ups. We also show that agglomeration 
(urbanization) is ambiguously related to start-ups, and that regional financial 
concentration will have an adverse impact on start-ups. In this latter regard, we are one 
of a few models concerned about the impact of financial sector concentration on 
regional economic development. 
We set out to provide a basic general theoretical model that could account for the start-
up process in a manner that allows for regional distinctions. Further extensions could 
include linking it to the structural economic transformation experienced by economies 
as they develop (so that start-ups not only influence the economic growth rate, but also 
the structural composition and rate of urbanization in the economy), by allowing for 
growth in firm sizes, and to model the process of firm exit. 
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Appendix 1a: Maximize the expected present value of the cash flow, of the new firm including 
probability of success  1 −   and failure   :  
EVmt  1 − 
t

pj − cxxje−rdv,tv−tdv  0,
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Determining the resulting periodic profit:  j  and profit reactions:  
dj
dcx   
j  pj − cxxj with cx  c ̄x
 1























Determining the expected maximum present value of the new firm:  
EVm  1 − 
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Appendix 1c : Solving for the steady state growth rate:  N,   
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Appendix 2: Show positive relation between  N  and potential human capital  H ,  
dN
dH    
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Appendix 3: show a positive relation between  N  and potential periodic monopoly profits  j , 
if e.g. costs of running the business will decrease  cx : 
dN
dj    
 
Proof of proposition 3: 
()
()
21 3 2 1
111 2 1( 1 ) 11








−−− ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞











































































Appendix 4: show a negative relation between  N  and business environment indicated by the 
risk of failure   : 
dN
d    
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Appendix 5: Show an ambiguous relation between  N  and degree of urbanization and 
agglomeration  A :
dN
dA    
 
Proof of proposition 5: 
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Appendix 6: Show an ambiguous relation between  N  and degree of urbanization and 
agglomeration  A :
dN
dA    
 





21 3 2 1
111







1( 1 ) 11
1




HP c A c
AB
d


















⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ =− + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎛⎞ −−
⎜⎟ =− −
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
 
 
 